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 “The difference between economics and psychology is that we 
psychologists never start our talks with assumptions that are wrong.” 
“That’s because you psychologists never make any assumptions at all.” 
              Apocryphal 
   
1.  Introduction 
In recent years,  behavioral economics has changed from niche topic to one that is 
well represented in all of the major  journals.  For economists who are wondering what 
all the fuss is about, Advances in Behavioral Economics  is an excellent introduction to 
the  field.  Advances reprints a  selection of the “greatest behavioral hits” of the 90’s,  
eighteen papers I would characterize as new research and seven surveys that were 
previously published in books or in review journals.
3  In addition, the editors contributed 
a substantial overview chapter, which outlines the contents of the book,  argues for the 
importance of behavioral economics for economics as a whole,  and speculates about 
promising new directions of research.   The book’s wide coverage and its well-articulated 
arguments for the field make it a valuable reference and teaching aide, and the included 
surveys will help newcomers catch up with what is now a very large literature. 
The book’s scope and arguments also make it a convenient platform for 
evaluating and critiquing the field as a whole, and that will be the main focus of this 
essay.  I will not try to survey the entire field,  or even all of the papers in Advances;  the 
first task would require a book and the second at least a monograph. Instead, my 
comments will emphasize the  ways the field could improve, as opposed to its successes 
so far. But first I should say a few words about the book itself. 
Other than the new chapter 1, which was written by the editors, the rest of  the 
book is unaltered reprints of previous papers. Part 2, “Basic Topics,” includes surveys, 
experimental results, and theoretical models; the Table of Contents groups these chapters 
by  topic  (e.g.  “Fairness  and  Social  Preference”  or  “Reference  Dependence  and  Loss 
Aversion”.) Part 3, “Applications,” consists mostly of analyses of field data, but also 
includes a survey that focuses on data from experiments.  At  740 pages, there is far too  
much material here for the book to be read straight through, and many readers may prefer 
to read all of the chapters that deal with a particular topic instead of reading the chapters 
in order.   For example, Chapter 6  (“Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review”, by Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue) and Chapter 7 
“(Doing it Now or Doing it Later”, by Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin) are under 
the  heading  “Intertemporal  Choice,”  while  Laibson’s  “Golden  Eggs  and  Hyperbolic 
Discounting”  is  in  the  “Macroeconomics  and  Savings”  section  of  Part  3;  a  reader 
interested in the behavioral economics of temptation and self-control might want to read 
all three of these chapters before reading about e.g. social preferences.  For that reason, it 
would have been nice to have a page at the start of each topic group in Part 2  that 
explained the relationship between the Part 2 papers and those in Part 3. It would also 
been nice to have a description of the relationship between the papers in the same section, 
as when one paper is a survey that discusses the following one. 
More ambitiously, it would have been very helpful for the book to have some new 
material that commented on the reprinted papers.  What new work has either reinforced 
or questioned the paper’s conclusions?  Do the authors endorse all of the claims of the 
included papers with equal confidence, or do some of them seem more convincing than 
others?  Which claims seem plausible but need further investigation?   This sort of 
commentary is unusual in collections of papers, but it is helpful in textbooks and surveys.  
 
2.  Progress to Date 
  One accomplishment of behavioral economics has been simply to draw 
economists’ attention to a range of facts and issues that seem important, such as 
anchoring and base-rate neglect in probability judgments  ( Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman [1974]) cognitive dissonance (George Akerlof and William Dickens [1982]), 
and the endowment effect (Jack Knetsch [1989].)  A second accomplishment has been to 
develop formal models that generate and  explain these regularities, and can be 
incorporated into larger models of markets or multi-agent experiments.  This second, 
more theoretical, agenda is the more likely to have a deep and lasting impact on the rest 
of economics, so improving it is the key to further advances in the field.  
Like the editors of Advances, I think that theories (both in economics and more 
generally) should be judged by George Stigler’s [1965] three criteria:  accuracy of 
predictions, generality, and tractability. The standard model of individual behavior does 
very well in terms of generality and tractability, but behavioral economics has helped highlight some areas where the standard model’s predictions are sufficiently wide of the 
mark that changes are valuable.   The challenge for the field is to generate more accurate 
predictions without sacrificing too much on the other two of Stigler’s criteria.   
Advances  focuses on three of the behavioral models that have been the most 
successful in this regard,  namely  models of loss aversion in the spirit of prospect theory 
(Chapters 4 and 5) ,  the quasi-hyperbolic model of intertemporal choice (as in David 
Laibson [1997] and Chapter 15) , and the Enrst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt [1999 and 
chapter 9] model of social preferences. Researchers continue to look for more general and 
elegant ways to capture the same sets of facts,
4 
5 
6  and in my opinion it is too early to 
decide that  any of these models should be accepted as canonical.  However, even  if one 
is not convinced by the specifics of the various models, they have been used to explain a 
wide range of observations, which at the least suggests that there are significant empirical 
regularities in the areas the models address. In addition, all of these models are   tractable 
enough to be embedded in richer and more complex settings, so that behavioral 
economists can and will adapt the models to explain yet more facts.  These models, and  
the diverse set of experimental and field data in Advances,  definitely justify Chapter 1’s 
claim that it is “unwise and inefficient to do economics without paying some attention to 
good psychology.”   
Since the publication of Advances,  the field has continued to evolve and progress, 
which further validates that position.  The most notable new development is the increased 
use of data from neural imaging, for example by Daniel McClure et al [2004] and 
Dominique deQuervain et al [2004. This is intriguing work, but its implications are subtle 
and perhaps more ambiguous than the research papers acknowledge; I discuss a few of 
the possible complications involved in Section 4.   
Another important development is the increased work on the implications of  
“psychologically-based” preferences, and non-standard preferences more generally, for 
market outcomes. A priori,  one might expect that these  preferences will have the 
clearest impact in monopoly markers, and that market competition would in some cases 
limit both the impact of “behavioral” agents on prices and  the extent to which these 
agents are exploited by others.   These theoretical questions are explored in recent work 
by e.g. Daniel Benjamin [2005], Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier [2004],  Edward Glaeser [2005], Laibson and Leeat Yariv [2005],  Karl Schlag [2005], Jesse 
Shapiro [2005],  and Rani Spiegler [2005].  
Finally, I should commend the recent literature that looks for evidence that the 
various sorts of behavioral preferences that subjects exhibit in laboratory experiments are 
actually observed in field data. Recent work by  Niva Ashraf, Dean Karlan, and Wesley 
Yin  [2005] and  Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier [2005 ] shows that agents 
are willing to pay a premium to reduce their options in some real-world decision 
problems.  Oriana Bandiera, Ivan Barankay, and Imran Rasul [2005] find evidence for 
social preferences in the difference between worker effort under relative incentives and 
under piece rates, and Marianne Bertrand et al  [2005] show that the way ads for bank 
loans are “framed” can have a substantial impact on market demand.    
 
2.  Advancing Beyond Advances 
 
The work described above is very interesting, and it is clear that much more can be 
learned by further research along these lines. However,  unless the insights and  stylized 
facts obtained so far are related to a small number of models of individual behavior, with 
some guidelines for when each model should be expected to apply, behavioral economics 
may remain a distinct field with its own methodology. Chapter 1 articulates a larger 
ambition: The hope that some sorts of “behavioral” models will lose “their special 
semantic status” (that is, the adjective “behavioral”) and become more widely taught and 
used. If that happens, the field will have advanced beyond “Behavioral Economics,” and 
the sequel to this volume won’t need to be called “More Advances in Behavioral 
Economics” or “Advances volume 2. From the editors’  perspective, the ideal situation 
might be one where the sequel could be called “Modern Decision Theory” or “Models of 
Consumer Choice.”  
 To achieve  this goal of becoming “normal economics,” the field will need to 
confront several issues; my comments here are intended to help it do so. Because of the 
context of this essay, my comments are phrased as criticisms of  Advances,  and mostly as 
criticisms of Chapter 1, but that should not obscure the respect that I have for the editors, 
or for the field as a whole. Indeed, Chapter 1 acknowledges most of what I see as the key challenges facing the field. Still, from my perspective the chapter probably understates 
the difficulties these challenges pose, so one of my goals is to better highlight the 
potential problems. Also, Chapter 1 doesn’t really acknowledge the extent to which the 
various parts of the book tend to focus on only one or two of these issues and ignore all 
of the others.   This may be partly justified by the “different tools for each situation” 
approach (see below), but I think that it would be useful for more behavioral economists 
to think about how the various “behavioral critiques” fit together. 
 
A Set of Assumptions should be evaluated as whole. 
As Chapter 1 declares, the standard approach in developing theories in behavioral 
economics is to “[…] modify one of two assumptions of the standard theory in the 
direction of greater psychological realism.” This approach presumes that since 
economists found a given set of assumptions useful,  the only issue in changing one of 
them is whether the new assumption on its own seems reasonable given the motivating 
facts.  However, this approach overlooks the fact that the factors that support one 
modification of the standard model may be correlated with factors that argue for further 
modifications. Thus, modifying  one or two assumptions and leaving the rest unchanged 
may lead to a logically consistent alternative model, but one whose domain of application 
is unclear or non-existent.   I illustrate this argument later in this section in discussing 
some applications of equilibrium analysis in behavioral economics, and also to some 
models of temptation and self-control, but these are not meant to be an exhaustive list. 
More generally, my point is that behavioral economics could be improved by adding a  
second step to the standard model-creation process described above: After modifying one 
or two of the standard assumptions, the modeler should consider whether the other 
assumptions are likely to be at least approximately correct in the situations the model is 
intended to describe, or whether the initial modifications suggest that other assumptions 
should be modified as well. 
 
Choice Overload in Modeling Choice  
The  fact that behavioral economists do not typically  examine the domain where 
all of their assumptions might simultaneously apply has probably contributed to one problem with the literature in this field: There are too many behavioral theories, most of 
which have too few applications. Chapter 1 of Advances addresses this concern, and 
replies roughly that it isn’t really a problem, as models correspond to tools, and a bigger 
toolkit is better. I did not find that response very convincing.  It is true that some 
economic models assume risk-neutrality and others assume risk aversion, some models  
assume selfish preferences and others add a bequest motive, and so on.  However, the 
current state of behavioral economics offers far too many tools, and too little guidance 
about when to use each one; without that guidance, a bigger toolkit need not help.
7     
As an example of the problem, consider the question of how to model mistakes in 
inference.  I know that agents do make various types of mistakes in this task, but I don’t 
know when the various mistakes are likely to be either more common or more significant.  
When I want to incorporate mistakes in inference into a model, should I follow the 
“confirmatory bias” models of Rabin and Schrag [1999] and Yaariv [2005], and assume 
that agents miscode evidence that their prior says is unlikely? Or Rabin [2002], and 
assume that agents update as Bayesians but treat independent draws as draws with 
replacement? Or Nicolas Barberis et al [1998] and assume that agents mistakenly think 
they see trends in i.i.d. data?   Or some combination of these?  Note that the problem here 
is different than deciding when to include e.g. bequest motives in a model: Bequest 
motives matter for lifetime savings, and hence influence the shadow value of wealth, but 
are unlikely to be relevant for many consumption decisions, while all of the inference 
mistakes described above are potentially relevant in a given inference problem. 
 
What should behavioral theories do? 
The proliferation of theories also raises the question of what the theories are 
trying to do.  Since psychology papers tend to be less formal than economists are used to, 
one useful but minor role of behavioral theories is simply to give a precise statement of 
the chosen behavioral regularity.  A second role is to exhibit a set of assumptions that can 
generate the specified behavior, be it the endowment effect or the law of small numbers. 
As an economic theorist, I don’t find either of these objectives very satisfying, and 
certainly neither is grounds for teaching the model in question in first-year 
microeconomic theory, any more than we teach the theory of various econometrically-convenient demand systems; these and other worthwhile models that have fairly special 
domains of applicability are taught in the various field courses.  This is not to say that I 
disagree with the authors’ goal of integrating some aspects of behavioral economics into 
first-year  classes, and indeed I already integrate some behavioral facts  (as opposed to 
behavioral theories) to illustrate the limitations of standard assumptions such as transitive 
preferences, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and common knowledge of 
rationality.  In addition, some behavioral models (such as that of Fehr and Schmidt) fit 
easily into the standard framework, and can be used as examples or homework problems. 
However,  before behavioral theory can be integrated into mainstream economics, the 
many assumptions that underlie its various models should eventually be reduced to the 
implications of a smaller set of more primitive assumptions. 
8  
In the long run, we could hope to derive behavioral phenomena such  as mental 
accounting and confirmation bias from such basic  properties such as bounded cognition 
(with a cost in both reaction time and resources for more accurate results) and the 
modular structure of the brain. We are probably  a long way from being able to do this, 
but in the meantime, behavioral economists and (and economic theorists!) should devote 
more effort to synthesizing existing models and developing more general ones, and less 
effort to modeling yet another  particular behavioral observation. To that end, the three 
areas I mentioned above- prospect theory/loss aversion, social preferences, and quasi-
hyperbolic preferences- should be held up as examples for emulation.  One or two more 
such “multi-use” theories will be far more valuable for behavioral economics and 
economics as a whole than any number of specail-purpose models whose main function 
is to formalize observations from the psychology literature. 
 
Context and Cues    
As Chapter 1 says, behavioral economics has emphasized the malleability and 
context-dependence of preferences and behavior.  Reinforcing this point, Chapter 17  on 
“Money Illusion” (Eldar Shafir, Peter Diamond, and Amos Tversky  [1999]) focuses on a 
empirical examples of a specific sort of framing effect, namely the tendency  for 
decisions to depend on absolute as well as relative price  level. Unfortunately, framing 
and context are very difficult to capture in formal models, and are ignored in most of the more formal papers in the field and in this book. This is true in particular of the papers on 
the topics of social preferences,  even though these phenomena have been shown to be 
very susceptible to framing. For example, the weight experimental subjects give to other 
subject’s payoffs can be altered by pre-interaction “speeches,” and also  by manipulations 
such as choosing the “dictator” in an ultimatum game by the results of a quiz.  Moreover, 
in some settings, such as wage negotiations, one or both of the parties involved may be 
both willing and able to manipulate the way the issue is framed.
9 This makes the need to 
a model of frame-determination all the more important.    
Another aspect of the malleability of preferences is the way that people to some 
extent view money rewards as being “as immediate and tempting” as an immediate utility 
payoff. Since people cannot literally consume currency, why do they act as if current 
monetary rewards are tempting?   In brief ,it seems that  the “impulsive” or short-run self 
treats money as a cue for an immediate reward even though the only real consequence of 
earning money is in the future.
10 This subjective equivalence of money and immediate 
gratification is important for the interpretation of empirical studies that show people 
exhibit “preference reversal”  about the timing of payoffs, as these studies almost always 
examine monetary payoffs and not consumption choices. 
11 It is also important for 
understanding the fact that human subjects exhibit a paradoxically large amount of risk 
aversion to small money gambles.
12 However, the tempting nature of  money leaves open 
the questions of exactly which financial rewards we should expect agents to view as 
tempting, and what other sorts of deferred rewards will be treated in the same way. Is 
money tempting if it  will be received later today? What about money to be received 
tomorrow afternoon?  When are people tempted by other sorts of “vouchers” for delayed 
consumption?
13 If it is costly or difficult to postpone gratification from today until next 
week, is it equally costly to postpone it until tonight? How does the answer depend on 
exactly what sort of gratification is at issue, and on where the decision is made?  
I do not know the answers to these questions, but I would like to suggest that the 
underlying mechanism (which is presumably some form of associative learning) may also 
underlie some types of framing effects. That is, an agent might be more tempted by one 
verbal description of a financial reward than another, even though they offer exactly the 
same sets of  consumption possibilities, and the difference in these temptations may be linked to how the agent has learned to respond to various cues.  (Note that people are not 
born with this sort of response to money; it is acquired as they learn how money is used) 
In any event, while the study of learning and conditioning may eventually lead to  useful 
models of frames, cues, and  “mental accounts” (see Chapter 3), for the time being they 
are a crucial but unexplained part of many behavioral analyses. 
 
Equilibrium: When and Why 
The next set of issues is of importance both for behavioral and “regular” 
economics. First, when is equilibrium analysis likely to be a good approximation of 
observed outcomes? Second, when it is not, what sort of models should be used to predict 
behavior outside of the lab? Game theorists have long understood that equilibrium 
analysis is unlikely to be a good predictor of the outcome the first time people play an 
unfamiliar game, and I think it is uncontroversial that some aspects of economic life are 
best described by non-equilibrium play.
14  However,  I argue below that the answer to the 
first question is less obvious than Chapter 1 suggests, and so far behavioral economists 
have been reliant on equilibrium analysis for developing  models of market outcomes. Of 
course, equilibrium is also the standard  assumption in “non-behavioral” economic 
applications of game theory, but the extensive discussion of  models of initial period, 
non-equilibrium, play in chapters 12 and 13 of Advances (Vincent Crawford  [1997] and 
Colin Camerer [2004] respectively) , and the book’s inclusion of this topic as part of 
“behavioral economics,” highlights the need for this material to be synthesized into the 
rest of the field. 
A brief review of the literature will help explain why it is not always obvious 
when the outcome of a game will approximate an equilibrium. There are extensive 
theoretical and experimental literatures on “learning in games,”  based on the idea that 
equilibrium can arise as the result of a non-equilibrium process of learning, imitation, or 
adaptation.
15 The former investigates the long-run properties of various learning models, 
comparing their performance (from the viewpoint of individual agents) and convergence 
properties (which processes converge to equilibrium in which classes of games), while 
the latter tries to distinguish between learning models on the basis of experimental data. 
Most of the formal models of learning in games, and most game-theory experiments, rely on the idea that agents play a game repeatedly against different opponents, in order to 
abstract from repeated game effects; this necessarily implies that agents use their 
experience with past opponents to guide their actions in the current game.  It is tempting 
to conclude from these models and experiments that equilibrium analysis almost never 
applies in the field, as agents rarely play exactly the same game a great many times.  But 
as argued in Fudenberg and David Kreps [1993] and Kreps [1990], any sort of learning 
involves extrapolation from past observations to settings that are deemed (implicitly or 
explicitly) to be similar,  so what matters is how often  agents have played “similar” 
games.  In addition, in field settings, unlike the lab, there are additional sources of 
information beyond direct experience: Agents may talk engage in “social learning” by 
asking the opinions and advice of friends, parents, and neighbors, and in some cases 
(such as retirement savings) they can also consult books, magazines, and outside 
experts.
16  The possibility of  non-equilibrium social learning does not mean that society 
effectively pools all information and ends up at an equilibrium, but it does mean that the 
applicability of equilibrium analysis to most field data is an empirical question that can’t 
be resolved by a priori  arguments. 
Unfortunately, once one leaves the controlled laboratory environment it is not clear 
how to identify equilibrium vs. non-equilibrium play.  If one is certain that payoffs are 
constant over time, then any movement in play at all shows that agents are not playing a 
static equilibrium, but this leaves open both the possibility that payoff functions vary and 
that play corresponds to the equilibrium of some dynamic game.  So what is needed is a 
plausible set of identifying restrictions on the nature of payoffs and strategies, and a 
model of non-equilibrium play that can be  econometrically implemented when the actual 
payoff functions of the players are unknown to the analyst.
17  Until something like this is 
done,  the implications of chapters 12 and 13 for field data will be difficult to determine, 
and it will be difficult to incorporate non-equilibrium reasoning with the rest of 
behavioral economics. 
 
Equilibrium Analysis in Behavioral Economics 
Although the status of equilibrium analysis when agents are “rational” is a 
problem for all of economics,  the assumption of equilibrium  and the choice of the appropriate equilibrium concept is even more problematic in some behavioral  models. 
As it relates to equilibrium, the  “change one assumption” approach to behavioral 
economics is to assume agents have a specific form of cognitive imperfection and then 
adopt a version of  Nash equilibrium that is as close as possible in form to the usual one. 
The problem with this approach is that, as noted above,  the usual rationales for Nash 
equilibrium (at least in laboratory experiments) rely on unbiased learning by the agents. 
If, as in Rabin and Schrag [1999], agents suffer from confirmation bias in learning about 
the distribution of chance moves, then it seems likely they would suffer from a similar 
bias in learning about opponents’ play. If they do, then models of non-equilibrium 
adjustment based on learning will not typically lead to Nash equilibrium.  
A similar concern arise in evaluating Eric Eyster and Mathew Rabin’s  [2005] 
concept of “cursed equilibrium.”  Experimental evidence shows in common-value 
auctions agents overbid and are thus subject to the “winner’s curse.”  Eyster and Rabin 
argue that this fact, and related errors in other incomplete-information games, can be 
explained by the concept of ￿ -cursed equilibrium. In this equilibrium, players have 
correct beliefs about the  joint distribution of types, and also have correct beliefs about 
the aggregate distribution of opponents’ play, conditional on each of their own types. 
However, instead of playing the best response to the actual opponents’ strategies, each 
player chooses the action that is the best response to a convex combination of the actual 
strategies and the aggregate distribution, with weight  ￿  on the aggregate distribution. In 
the “fully cursed” case where  ￿ ￿ ￿ , agents completely ignore the correlation between 
other players’ actions and their types;  this corresponds to the outcome of  a learning 
model in which agents observe opponents’ actions but neither the opponents’ types nor 
their own payoffs.
18  The case  ￿ ￿ ￿  is even easier to explain, as it corresponds to the 
usual Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.  However, it is hard to imagine a reasonable learning 
process that leads to the intermediate cases.  It is true that in some cases intermediate 
values of ￿  fit better than either extreme, but this is not evidence that the model is a 
good approximation of what is really going on. In addition, the fact that the amount of 
“cursedness” typically declines as subjects become more experienced suggests  that the 
curse, while real, is not an equilibrium phenomenon.
19  A related problem with Bayesian equilibrium arises in Roland Benabou and Jean 
Tirole’s  [2003] model of a Bayesian equilibrium between various “selves,” where each 
self knows the distribution of the other selves’ possible “types”, and also their 
equilibrium strategies. The situation here differs in that each self has correct beliefs, so 
there is not an inherent conflict with the assumption of equilibrium. Rather, the problem 
is that for  non-equilibrium learning to lead to the Benabou-Tirole  equilibrium, the 
player’s type(s) would have to be independently and identically distributed across 
repetition.   If, as seems more reasonable in this setting, the player’s “type” (e.g. ability or 
self-control ability)  is fixed once and for all, then learning will not lead to the Bayesian 
equilibrium that is analyzed by Benabou and Tirole, but to the Nash equilibrium for the 
game where the payoff function is known.  
The O’Donoghue and Rabin  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ model of time preference [1999, 2001] has 
complete information, in the sense that each of the “selves” is certain  of the payoff 
functions of the others, but it suffers from a related problem.  In this model, at each date t  
the agent values utilities at future dates ￿  at  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  current utils, but forecasts that his 
future play corresponds to the multiple-selves equilibrium of  the standard (or 
“sophisticated”) quasi-hyperbolic model in which the selves playing at each date t  
evaluate future utilities at  ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  utils, and this is common knowledge between the 
selves. The model is motivated by evidence that people sometimes misperceive their own 
behavior, but it is not clear how anyone would come to make this particular form of 
mistaken forecast, and once again a non-equilibrium model might be a better match for 
the facts the model is trying to explain.   Of course,  one reason for the use of equilibrium 
models here is simply the lack of a standard off-the-shelf alternative, and despite their 
flaws these “faux-equilibrium” models have been useful in showing that these sorts of  
behavior can be modeled and analyzed, instead of merely noted and then ignored.  Still, I 
think that behavioral economics would be well served by concerted attempts to provide 
learning-theoretic (or any other) foundations for its equilibrium concepts. At the least, 
this process might provide a better understanding of when the currently-used concepts 
apply, but I expect that a serious effort to find foundations will typically end up suggesting  somewhat different, and more accurate, solution concepts than the ones I 
have criticized above.   
 
Models of Temptation and Self-Control 
Equilibrium analysis is not the only area of behavioral economics where the  
usual change-one-assumption approach overlooks the question of how the entire set of 
assumptions fits together. As a second example, consider the question of how to model 
the idea that agents know they have a self-control problem, and so can be willing to pay a 
premium to reduce their own future choices. The two leading models of this idea are 
quasi-hyperbolic preferences, as in Laibson [1997 and Chapter 15], and the Gul and 
Pesendorfer [2001] axioms and corresponding representation. Each of these approaches 
either implicitly (Laibson) or explicitly (Gul and Pesendorfer) imposes a  form of the 
classical “independence axiom” on choices over menus of actions.  However, if agents 
will face a self-control problem in choosing an item from a menu,  it is not obvious that 
the independence axiom should apply. Moreover, the independence axiom should be 
expected to generally fail if agents must take some sort of self-control action, just as it 
does when agents must commit to some of their consumption decisions before knowing 
the outcome of a wealth lottery.
20  Thus the independence axiom is less compelling here 
on a priori  grounds than in the standard model, where it has a normative justification.  In 
addition,  Fudenberg and Levine [2005] argue that evidence that self control is a scarce 
resource (Muraven and  Baumeister [2000], Muraven, Tice, and Baumeister [1998]) and 
is impaired by cognitive load (Shiv and Fedorhikin [1999]. Ward and Mann [2000]) 
supports models of self-control that are not consistent with the form of the independence 
axiom that the quasi-hyperbolic and Gul-Pesendorfer frameworks assume.  
Once again, the models I am criticizing have been useful and important, which is 
not by accident- there is little point in explaining how to improve on models that are 
widely viewed as flawed or uninteresting.   
 
Bounded Rationality   
In recent years, behavioral economics has evolved more or less independently of 
the literature on “bounded rationality.”
21  It is hard to give a precise definition of bounded rationality, or to draw a sharp line between it and behavioral economics, but bounded 
rationality papers typically suppose that some agents (consumers, firms, or both)  use  
exogenous “rules of thumb,” and then derive the consequences. In  principle, it would be 
nicer to derive these exogenous rules from a small set of fairly standard assumptions, and 
one might hope that behavioral economics could eventually do so. Even when a formal 
derivation isn’t possible, one might feel the conjectured rule is more plausible if it can be 
shown to be rooted in psychological observations that apply more generally.  However,  
the psychology literature is large, and many of its claims are imprecise, so simply finding  
a  concept or claim in the psychology literature that is consistent with the conjecture may 
not make the rule any more convincing.  This  is particularly true when the psychology 
literature doesn’t provide sharp restrictions on just when one should expect to see the 
behavior in question.  
As an example, consider the fact that in some settings some consumers seem to 
use ignore relevant product characteristics, such as shipping costs (Hossain  and John 
Morgan [2004]) or the cost of ink for printers (Xavier Gabaix and Laibson [2005].) 
Moreover, firms in some markets act as if they are aware of the consumers’ tendency to 
ignore characteristics, and reinforce it by making the relevant information hard to find 
(Glenn Ellison and Sarah Fisher Ellison [2005].)  We don’t expect consumers to neglect 
all sorts of information, but we also don’t seem to have a useful theory of just what will 
be ignored in which situations, so for the time being it seems better to simply make this 
neglect an ad-hoc assumption.
22  Similarly, in some situations people appear to use  
simple heuristics such as “pick a product with probability equal to its market share” 
(Smallwood and Conlisk [1978])  or “identify the average payoff or utility of a product 
with its value in a small sample (Ellison and Fudenberg [1995], Spiegler [2004].)  One 
long-term goal for behavioral economics is to incorporate more of these ad-hoc rules into 
its formal framework.  This will require a bit of a  methodological shift for the field, as it 
involves looking for inspiration to the older economics literature in addition to 
psychology.  
      
4.  Interviews and Inner-views   Behavioral economists are beginning to use two sorts of data that lie outside the 
traditional scope of economics, namely questionnaires about mental states  (e.g. “How 
happy are you right now?”  “ How happy would  you be if x  occurred ?”)   and data such 
as neural imaging on physiological processes inside the brain.  On a classical revealed-
preference view, neither sort of data is of interest, but I believe that this data can indeed 
be of use, provided it is interpreted correctly.   
 
  Neuro-economics: Do economists need (data about) brains?. 
Neural imaging work so far is suggestive of how certain sorts of decisions are 
made.   Even if one takes the view that the only goal of economics is predicting behavior 
on the basis of “external” variables, having a model that is in better accord with the 
underlying structure of the brain can be valuable, as it may lead to more accurate out-of-
sample predictions.
23 
However, the interpretation of neural imaging and neurobiological data can be 
difficult and subtle, especially when one tries to use imaging data to resolve debates,  as 
opposed to suggesting models. As an example of this difficulty, I am going to focus  on a 
small and not representative  portion of the excellent survey by Fehr et al [2005] on the 
“Neuroeconomics of Trust and Social Preferences.”  I found most of their arguments 
quite convincing, but at one point I was not convinced when they said that the evidence 
they present casts doubt on the  claim in Samuelson [2005]  that observed cooperation in 
the one-shot prisoners dilemma might be a consequence of players mistakenly treating 
the game as if it were part of a repeated interaction.  This claim is an updated version of 
the “misperception” argument  of Kenneth Binmore and Samuelson [1995], which Levine 
and I have previously criticized, (Fudenberg and Levine [1998], p. 98 )   and I do not 
mean to defend it here, but I do wish to question the extent to which the data cited by 
Fehr et al can help resolve the issue. Basically, Fehr et al note that  there is more striatum 
activation when players cooperate with a human than when they cooperate with a 
computer, and  also more activation than from receiving the same payment as an 
uncontingent reward. They argue that this shows that people are  happier and derive more 
utility from interactions with cooperative people, and suggest that this refutes the 
explanation based on misperceptions. However, the Fehr et al argument seems to rest on the assumption that whatever misperceptions Binmore and Samuelson have in mind have 
no effect on striatum activation, and at this point there is no reason to think that this is the 
case. 
24 
More generally, at this point neural imaging can provide insights into the mechanisms 
of various behaviors and cognitive processes, and these insights may suggest useful 
experiments or interesting models, but we must be careful to distinguish neural correlates 
of a behavior from its causes.  One concern is that many parts of the brain seem to be 
involved in processing rewards. Even in apparently simpler cases such as a monkey’s 
valuation for various foods, where researchers have identified individual neurons whose 
activation is correlated with value,  the mechanism by which this reward information is 
generated and used for decision making is not understood.
25 In particular, activations in 
one brain region may be the consequence of activations at  other “upstream” neurons.
26  
A second concern is to not confuse “biological” with “genetically determined.” For 
example, a number of studies have shown that people in different countries and cultures 
tend to play differently in a range of stylized laboratory experiments, and  these 
differences are  presumably correlated with differential activation in some parts of the 
brain that are involved in assessing rewards and making decisions.
27  However, such a 
correlation would be consistent with the two cultures being genetically identical, as the 
differential activations could be a learned response to living in different cultures. In that 
case it would seem more natural to think of the activation patterns as a consequence, and 
not a cause, of the difference in cultures. 
28 
Regardless of these issues of causality and interpretation, it is intriguing that neural 
imaging data can be used to predict future behavior. One of the best examples of this is in 
de Quervain et al [2004], who look at activations when agents decide to punish. In their 
experiment,  players A and B are each endowed with 10 “money units.” Player A can 
either keep his endowment of 10 or send it to player B; money sent to player B is 
quadrupled by the experimenter, if A sends 10, then B has 50. Next, B has the choice of 
sending back either nothing or half of the 50. Finally, A has the option of “punishing” B 
by assigning up to 20 “punishment points;” the cost to A and B of this punishment varies 
over treatments. In  condition IC, punishment is costly to player A and costly to player B; 
in condition IF, punishment is  free for player A and costly to B. There were 11 subjects who punished maximally in IF. For these subjects, differences activation levels cannot be 
due to the chosen punishment, so it is natural to interpret them as a sign of the “reward to 
punishing. Strikingly, de  Quervain et al [2004 ]  find that in this pool of 11 players,  
activation levels (of a particular neuron in the caudate) when punishing maximally in IF 
are correlated with the punishments they choose in IC.  That is, observing activations of 
different agents making the same choice in IF helps predict choice in IC. I expect that 
neuroeconomists will develop  more of these sorts of predictions in the future. It seems 
too early to know just how much impact this will have on most of economics, but the 
potential impact is large, and the research underway is fascinating. Thus, while I don’t 
think that every economist ought to take up neuroeconomics,  I do think that anyone 




  Are we having fun (yet)? 
It is if anything even more difficult for me to evaluate the usefulness of  work on 
“affective forecasting” (e.g. Wilson et al [2003]) and “predictive utility” ( Kahneman 
[1999]), which asks subjects “how happy are you now” and “how happy would you be if 
this outcome occurred?”  This literature argues that there reports are a good measure of 
peoples’  internal states. It also argues that people make systematic mistakes both in 
predicting how various outcomes will influence their happiness, and in remembering how 
happy they were in the past.    
One possible, albeit crude and simplified,  interpretation of this work goes as 
follows. First, reported happiness is a good measure for happiness as a subjective mental 
state, possibly modulo some systematic but constant differences in reporting across 
countries and cultures.  Next, people always choose the actions that they think will make 
them happiest. (This view has some well-known adherents, including Daniel Gilbert.) 
Thus,  the systematic forecasting errors found in the literature on affective forecasting  
show that people often make mistakes in trying to in predict how various actions will 
make them feel, and moreover that these mistakes lead people  to take the “wrong” 
actions. Hence, revealed preferences are not the best guide for evaluating the effects of 
various government policies.  More strongly, one might conclude  that welfare judgments and policy decisions should take as their objective the reported happiness  of the 
population.    
In thinking about these ideas, it is helpful to distinguish between welfare 
economics as political economy- how we think the government should make decisions- 
and welfare economics as  moral philosophy- how we would advise others to behave. 
Even if we believe people do make systematic errors in evaluating how various choices 
will influence the appropriately-defined measure of their “welfare”,  we might not trust 
that  the government or policy analysts would make better evaluations.  For this reason,  
it is consistent to believe both that people make mistakes and that government policy 
(with a few exceptions) be based on the assumption people’s actions and ex-ante 
predictions are the best guide to what is in their own interests. 
30   
However, the situation is different when considering how we plan our own 
behavior or advise others how to behave, as knowledge of typical errors can help prevent 
one from making them. This distinction between the sorts of preferences that are 
considered valid in policy evaluation,  and sorts of preferences that “reasonable” is 
important even in the absence of survey or neural data, and it holds even when people 
perfectly predict all of their future mental states. For example, it is consistent with the 
standard model to be completely impatient, and assign value 0 to all future payoffs, but  
as an advisor or parent I would view this extreme short-sightedness as a mistake.   
Indeed, a major task of parents is trying to teach children the “appropriate” weight to give 
to future consequences. 
31 Similarly, the standard “rationality” axioms  for subjective 
probabilities don’t imply that people’s probability forecasts should be calibrated in the 
sense of Alpert and Howard Raiffa [1982]: it is “rational” to make all of one’s of   90% 
confidence intervals so small that they rarely contain the true value of the variable in 
question.  Yet people whose subjective beliefs are too far from reality are deemed insane, 
and Bruno Biais et al [2004] find that subjects who are better calibrated  (with respect to 
a number of questions about irrelevant statistics) do better in an experimental asset 
market.  Thus the questions that “mistakes” pose for welfare economics are much broader 
than the traditional subject matter of behavioral economists. 
Moving from welfare economics to the conceptually clearer task of predicting 
behavior,  Miles Kimball and Robert Willis [2005] sketch a framework for using survey data on happiness to better estimate and forecast consumer demand. If their project is 
successful, it will move survey data into the mainstream  economics, but it is too early to 
tell if that will be the case.  REFERENCES 
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illustrate the evolution I have in mind. When I was a graduate student in the late 1970’s,  the only game 
theory taught in first-year graduate classes at Harvard and MIT was Cournot equilibrium, which was fit 
uneasily into the theory sequence to show how prices approach the competitive limit as the number of firms 
grows. The reason that game theory has expanded its share of  first-year classes is that  its has evolved from 
a collection of examples and special cases to a much more general framework Early authors such as 
Cournot,  Bertrand, Hotelling  and Stackelberg offered stand-alone solution concepts for particular 
situations, but the field did not really exist before the development and analysis of general constant-sum 
games by John von Neumann, and it did not become useful for economic applications until John Nash 
formulated the general  Nash equilibrium concept, which made it possible to see the solutions proposed by 
Cournot, Bertrand, and Hotelling as special cases corresponding to different strategy spaces. But the Nash 
concept on its own proved too limited to provide a foundation for analyzing many  important situations, 
which may be why game theory had not  made much of an inroad into economics by 1970.  Economists in 
the 1960’s and 70’s extended the application of game theory to the study of commitment and timing on an 
ad-hoc basis by making assertions about which out-of-equilibrium responses players should view as 
credible; subsequent authors grounded this analysis using refinements of Nash equilibrium such as 
subgame- perfect equilibrium. Over the same period, economists moved from ad-hoc analyses of games of 
incomplete information to analyses based on Harsanyi’s reformulation; game theory became a major part of 
graduate classes once the combined power of the Nash, Harsanyi and Selten work became evident.                                                                                                                                                   
9 Most direct evidence of framing effects has so far come from laboratory settings, but the Bertrand et al 
[2005] study of ads for bank loans shows that framing can have significant economic effects in the field. 
10 This is consistent with evidence (such as Pavlov’s bell) that the impulsive short-run self responds to 
learned behavioral cues in addition to direct stimuli. Modern physiological research is making progress in 
identifying some of the brain chemistry that reflects the response to these stimuli, see, for example, Haruno 
et al [2004]. Camerer, Lowenstein and Prelec [2004] say that “roughly speaking, it appears that similar 
brain circuitry (dopaminergic neurons in the midbrain) is active for a wide variety of rewarding experiences 
(including) money rewards.” 
11 This is true for example of the many studies cited in Chapter 6, (Shane  Frederick,  George Loewenstein, 
and Ted O’Donoghue [2004])  p. 173.. 
12 Rabin [2000] calls this “the paradox of risk aversion in the small and in the large.” Fudenberg and  
Levine [2005] propose an explanation of this paradox based on the ideas  of self-control costs and a cash-
in-advance  constraint on purchases. 
13 McLure et al [2004] argue that their subjects treat Amazon.com gift certificates as if they represented 
immediate consumption. The Shiv and Ferorihkin [1999] experiment suggests that a  ticket for chocolate 
cake (to be consumed in a few minutes) is more tempting when accompanied by the display of a chocolate 
cake than when it is accompanied only by a photograph of a cake.  
14 The idea that not all play is equilibrium play has a long history in the game theory literature, and the 
papers cited in the section on game theory (Chapters 12 and 13) make very little use of observations or 
insights from psychology (although Chapter 13 does discuss social preferences.)  Thus, while it is better 
economics to acknowledge the likelihood of non-equilibrium play in some settings,  it is not clear why  this 
falls under the definition  of behavioral economics as “modifying […] standard assumptions in the direction 
of greater psychological  realism.”  (emphasis added).  
15 The books by  Fudenberg and Levine [1998], Kreps [1990], Larry Samuelson, [1998],  Jörgen Weibull 
[1995] and Peyton Young [2004] discuss  theoretical models of learning and other sorts of non-equilibrium 
adjustment procedures.  Many chapters in the Handbook of Experimental Economics (edited by John Kagel 
and Alvin Roth, 1995) discuss the effect of learning on play in game theory experiments, as do Chapters 12 
. ry experiments. 
16 Glenn Ellison and Fudenberg [1993], [1995] discuss models of boundedly-rational social learning about 
the state of Nature; the models of Bjornstedt and Weibull [1995] and Schlag [1998] can be viewed as a 
form of boundedly-rational social learning about opponents’ strategies 
17 Work to date on estimating payoff functions using the equilibrium assumption is only partially 
encouraging in this regard. Bajari et al [2005] provide conditions under which payoff functions can be 
estimated without parametric restrictions. They require that the privately observed shocks to payoffs are an 
additive term that depend only on the player’s own action  and independent over time and across players. as 
in Fudenberg and Kreps [1993] and Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey [1995], and in addition that the  
distribution of the shocks is known up to a parameter, and that the game has a unique equilibrium. Ariel 
Pakes, Michael Ostrovsky, and Steve Berry  [2005]show how to estimate the Markov- perfect equilibrium 
for dynamic games of entry and exit; their procedure  relies on  functional forms for the payoff functions 
and also the assumption that play is Markov with respect to the designated state space. It isn' t clear at this 
point how to distinguish  non-equilibrium play from play of an equilibrium that isn’t Markov, or 
equivalently is Markov on a different state space. Thus, while progress is being made in estimating 
equilibria, it may be difficult to find conditions that will equilibrium from non-equilibrium play in field 
data. 
18 Dekel et al [2004] provide a learning-theoretic analysis of how the outcomes of Bayesian games  depends 
on what agents observe when the game is played.  Their analysis  assumes that players’ equilibrium beliefs 
are consistent with what they observe when the equilibrium is played; one possible way to provide 
foundations for the equilibrium concepts I criticize here would be to modify the Dekel et al setup to reflect 
a specified form of cognitive error.    
19 John Kagel [1995] surveys many results on how the extent of the winner’s curse varies as the subjects 
gain experience; Kagel and Jean-Francois Richard  [2001] argue that “super-experienced” bidders are not 
subject to this curse.  If it turned out  that a wide range of data could be explained with a fixed value of 
￿ ￿ ￿ , there would be a positivist case for using cursed equilibrium despite its lack of foundations, but in 
practice the extent of cursedness varies. Recently Vincent Crawford and Nagore Iriberri [2005]  have                                                                                                                                                  
proposed an alternative explanation for overbidding by inexperienced subjects in common-value auctions 
that is based on “k level reasoning” instead of equilibrium analysis. 
20   Intuitively, when consumption must be set ahead of time, agents prefer lotteries with less variance, so 
neither the independence axiom nor the substitution axiom (i.e., the reduction of compound lotteries to 
simple ones) should be expected to hold; see  Spence and Zeckhauser [1972] and Machina [1984] for 
details.  Gul and Pesendorfer do not specify any particular processes that might underlie their assumptions 
on preferences, so in particular they do not assume that self-control requires effort; the argument above 
shows a difficulty with one possible interpretation. 
21 See Ellison [2005] for a recent survey of the bounded rationality literature. 
22 Note that  a significant fraction of consumers do seem to consider gasoline mileage when buying cars.  
This  is probably related to the fact that mainstream newspapers report on gas prices, and as  do their car 
reviews, while printer reviews and discussions of ink prices are found only in more specialized media, but 
the causality of the relationship is unclear. 
23  This conclusion rests on the belief that models with more accurate assumptions make more accurate 
predictions, so that the “’second-best problem” does not arise.  As a personal example, the neuro-imaging 
work of McLure et al [2004] was the impetus for my work with Levine on a dual-self model of impulse 
control. 
24 To expand on these points,  suppose that we look at activations in the first period in which a player 
chooses to defect. If  striatum activation is different here than in previous periods, the activation is not 
simply coding the pleasure of interacting with cooperators. As a second thought experiment, suppose we 
pair  human subjects with human stooges who always play C. Some of these subjects will learn that it pays 
to always play D. If, as I expect, the striatum activation will be less than that of someone who always plays 
C, it will be hard to interpret the activation as the hedonic utility of meeting a friendly opponent.  The 
interpretation of data on striatum activation is further clouded by the fact  that reward-related activations 
are greater for unexpected than for expected rewards (Schulz et al [1997]). It is true that Singer et al [2004] 
show that viewing faces of people who previously cooperated activates a number of other reward-related 
areas, but once again this fact seems open to several interpretations. 
25 See Camilo Padoa-Schioppa and John Assad [2005]. 
26 See Platt and Paul Glimcher [1999] and John O’Doherty [2004]. 
27 Roth,  Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, and Shmuel Zamir  [1991] was the first formal study 
of cross-country differences in game theory experimemnts; the book by Joseph Henrich,  Robert Boyd, 
Samuel Bowles, Camerer, Fehr, and Herbert Gintis [2004] surveys a number of  more recent studies.  
28 Of course it is also possible that over a long enough time span the difference in cultures could have an 
effect on genetics, in which case the causality would be more complicated 
29 The interaction between economic theory and neuroscience is not one-way, as decision and game-
theoretic models have been used to predict how the firing of  certain neurons varies with changes in 
payoffs, as for example in Platt and Glimcher [1999].   
30  Recent work by  James Choi et al [2004] on the impact of default options and O’Donoghue and Rabin 
[2003] on “conservative paternalism” explore how  to set policies that let  help correct  errors of 
“irrational” agents with minimal  interference to the choices of “rational” ones.   
31  The primary reference for this assertion is folk wisdom and personal experience, but it is interesting to 
note that it accords with the findings of Mischel, Shoda and Rodriguez [1989] that “those 4-year-old 
children who delayed gratification  longer in certain laboratory situations developed into more cognitively 
and socially competent adolescents.”   Benjamin and Shapiro [2005] find that students who do better on 
standardized math tests are more patient over short-term trade-offs and less risk-averse over small gambles.  
The causal relationship between patience and various measures of performance remains an open question, 
see Benjamin and Shapiro for some thoughts on this issue. 